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The First Years of the
South African Constitutional Court
Hon. Justice Richard J. Goldstone

By their nature, constitutions are more or less transformational.
Some have provided the bridge from colonial rule to independence;
others provide the bridge from oppression to freedom. The extent to
which the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 was intended to
transform Canadian society remains a topic of controversy among
Canadian lawyers. There can be no doubt that South Africa’s Constitution
was intended to and has achieved a wholesale transformation of our
society. It was self-consciously designed to transform our nation from
oppression and racism to freedom and democracy.
One of the demands made by the leaders of the “black” majority was
a new apex court, the Constitutional Court. We followed the German
model by situating that court above the existing courts. In order not to
upset the members of the then highest court, the Supreme Court of
Appeal (as it is now called), the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court
was limited to “constitutional issues” and matters related to them. The
determination of what constitutes a constitutional issue is left by the
Constitution for the Constitutional Court to determine. In Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Assn. of SA and Another In Re the Ex Parte Application
of the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others2 it was held
that the control of public power by the courts through judicial review is
and always has been a constitutional matter. The Court said that:
The interim Constitution which came into force in April 1994 was a
legal watershed. It shifted constitutionalism, and with it all aspects of
public law, from the realm of common law to the prescripts of a
written constitution which is the supreme law.
…..



Judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, July 1994 to October 2003.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
2000 (2) SA 674 (South Africa CC).
1

26

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

… [J]udicial review of the exercise of public power is a constitutional
matter that takes place under the Constitution and in accordance with
its provisions.3

In effect this made all violations of the rule of law “constitutional
issues”. This included administrative law decisions.
In 1990, when it was decided by South Africa’s white leadership to
abandon Apartheid and usher in a new democratic form of government,
there was a seemingly irresoluble difference at the fundamental level of
how a new constitution should be fashioned.
The “white” leaders, led by then President, F.W. de Klerk, were not
prepared to give a blank cheque to the “black” majority. They were
nervous of the close association of the African National Congress and
the South African Communist Party as well as the powerful trade union
movement that was also an integral part of the alliance. There was white
fear that, if left to its own devices, the majority would write a socialiststyle document and that it would not protect the property that had been
acquired over the centuries of white rule. On the other side, the “black”
leaders, led by Nelson Mandela, insisted that the constitution be drafted
by way of a democratic process and that the minority should not have a
veto in that process.
This apparently intractable difference was resolved in a highly
unusual way. It was agreed that there would a two-part process. An
interim constitution would usher in the democracy with the first one
person, one vote national election. The duly elected representatives of all
of the people would constitute a constitutional assembly and draft the
final constitution. That met the demands of Nelson Mandela. To meet
the demands of de Klerk, it was agreed that the interim constitution
would contain the skeleton of the final constitution. That was achieved
by way of a schedule containing 34 articles that came to be known as the
34 constitutional principles. The final constitution was required to
comply fully with each of the principles contained in the 34 articles.
The obvious question was how and by whom it would be decided
that the final constitution complied with the 34 constitutional principles.
It was decided that that should be the task of the Constitutional Court.
This was a huge responsibility and in effect meant the 11 unelected
justices would have to determine the constitutionality of the constitution!
We were obliged by the interim constitution to hear oral argument on
behalf of the Constitutional Assembly that consisted of the members of
3

Id., at paras. 45 and 51.
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both House of Parliament, and on behalf of all political parties
represented in Parliament. In the exercise of our discretion we invited
members of the public to make written representations reserving the
right to determine which of them would be entitled, in addition, to
appear and make oral representations. In the result we received
representations from five political parties and 84 private parties. In July
1996, we heard argument on behalf of the Constitutional Assembly, five
political parties and 27 other bodies or persons. In deciding whom to
invite to present oral argument, we were guided by the nature, novelty,
cogency and importance of the points raised in the written submissions.
After many conferences we unanimously held that the final
constitution failed to comply with the 34 constitutional principles in
respect of 12 areas.4 The Interim Constitution anticipated that there
might be such a result and allowed the Constitutional Assembly to
amend the constitution in order to bring it in line with the decision of the
Court. In that context we issued a detailed judgment explaining as
clearly as possible our decision. The Constitutional Assembly amended
the constitution in order to meet the problems and referred it back for a
consideration by the Court. Again, we heard many representations and in
the end result certified that the whole constitution now complied with the
34 constitutional principles. Fortunately we were again unanimous in our
decision.5 What we call “the final Constitution” became effective in
February 1997.
I hardly need to add that it was a huge responsibility and, at the same
time, an unusual privilege, to have had the opportunity of sitting on our
first Constitutional Court. It was also an exciting and joyful experience
to be a member of a highly collegial court and finding that we all shared
a common understanding of the role we were called upon to play.
Save for the death penalty, the representatives of all political parties
reached rapid accord on the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Broadly
speaking, the white leaders were in favour of retaining capital
punishment while the black leaders wished to abolish it. It was decided
to leave this issue for determination by the Constitutional Court. That
issue was to be the first case heard by the new Court.

4

Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly; Re Certification of the Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,1996 (4) SALR 744 (South Africa CC).
5
Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996, 1997 (2) SALR 97 (South Africa CC).
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The reason for agreement on the Bill of Rights is not difficult to
locate. The anti-Apartheid movement, both within South Africa and
internationally, was essentially a human rights movement. The black
leaders always assumed that a democratic South Africa would be
governed by an egalitarian constitution reflecting all internationally
recognized human rights. This was demonstrated by the 1956 Freedom
Charter adopted at a mass meeting outside Johannesburg. The Freedom
Charter called for a democratic South Africa founded on non-racism and
non-sexism. It declared that the land belonged to its entire people
regardless of colour. It was a document well in advance of its times and
clearly influenced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. No
other freedom movement, whether on the African or any other continent,
could claim to be or to have been a human rights movement.
The majority of white South Africans had spurned human rights and
accepted the benefits that came from the racist oppression of the
Apartheid state. When white South Africans saw the writing on the wall
and realized that they were to be governed by a majority of all South
Africans, they became instant converts to protection by a Bill of Rights.
Both sides welcomed wide-reaching protections against untrammelled
rule by the majority.
I return to the Constitutional Court. It is a quirk of history that the
first time the 11 members of the new Court met was not in South Africa.
The German Ambassador to South Africa suggested to the President of
the German Constitutional Court that having regard to the similar
reasons for the establishment of both courts, she should invite the
members of our Court to a joint seminar with the members of the
German Constitutional Court on issues that might be useful for us. We
eagerly accepted an invitation to spend a week in Karlsruhe. This, I am
sure, is another unique feature of the early years of our Court.
The first 11 judges of our Court consisted of seven white and four
black members. Two were women. The new members of the Court were
all aware of the transformational nature of the new Constitution and the
heavy responsibilities that we had assumed in sitting on our new
democracy’s highest court.
It was after the visit to Germany that we held our first business
meeting. We had to decide on the manner in which we would conduct
our business and even the appearance of the Court and its members. We
wanted to demonstrate to the people of South Africa that we were not
another South African court continuing in the tradition of the old. The
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new values were in stark contrast to the old. The founding values are
well stated in the first section of the final Constitution to be:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement
of human rights and freedoms.
Non-racialism and non-sexism.
Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.
Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular
elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.

We were conscious that these new values should be reflected in
everything the new Court would do in the course of its business. Some
of the issues we decided included:
(a) How we would robe. We did not wish to look like the existing
judges who were identified by the majority of South Africans with
the discredited Apartheid judicial system. South African judges had
always worn black robes in the tradition we inherited from England.
We decided that we would wear green gowns with the colours of our
new flag on the sleeves of unisex robes.
(b) We would not be addressed as “Milord” or worse “Milady” but as
“Justice”.
(c) We wanted the bench in the new Court (initially in a converted
office building) to be raised minimally so that we could have
comfortable eye contact with counsel — both for their benefit and to
avoid the appearance of our being perceived to be remote from the
people who visited court.
(d) Obviously we would not take into account the seniority of the judges
who had been appointed during the Apartheid era (of whom there
were six). We decided, after much debate, to abandon seniority. The
Chief Justice would preside and have the Deputy Chief Justice on
his right and the other judges would sit in different seats during each
of the four terms. Those would be determined by the Chief Justice
by drawing names from a “hat”. We would walk in and out of court
in the order in which we were seated. Opinions would be signed in
alphabetical order.
(e) We would establish a media committee, the work of which was to
assist journalists in gaining effective access to the work of the Court,
its decisions and documents. We also agreed to prepare a media
release to accompany all opinions, explaining, in lay terms, the gist
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of the decisions. We were also determined to have a user-friendly
website.
None of the members of the new Court had received any formal
training in either constitutional law or human rights law. This presented
an enjoyable and interesting challenge. I need hardly add that the use of
foreign law played a crucial role in this regard. This, too, was anticipated
by the drafters of the Constitution. Section 39(1) of the Bill of Rights
provides that:
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum
a.
b.
c.

must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
must consider international law; and
may consider foreign law.

And, section 233 of the Constitution provides that:
When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent
with international law.

Furthermore, one finds repeated references in the Constitution to
“what is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. One of the most
important is to be found in section 36, which governs the permissible
extent to which rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights may be limited by
legislation. These words are familiar to this audience and were clearly
inspired by section 1 of the Canadian Charter.
From the beginning, our Constitution and our Court’s jurisprudence
were influenced by the Canadian experience. The Canadian Charter was
an obvious source of inspiration. It was a comparatively new comer and
leading Canadian constitutional lawyers assisted with the drafting
process for our Interim Constitution and especially the Bill of Rights.
The first judgment issued by the Court required a provision of the
Bill of Rights to be interpreted. The following dictum of Dickson J. (as
he then was) in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.6 was cited with approval:
In my view this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of
the right or freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the

6

[1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 344 (S.C.C.).
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character and larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language
chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical
origins of the concept enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning
and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is
associated within the text of the Charter. 7

That purposive approach to the interpretation of our Constitution has
consistently been followed by the Court.
In the same case, the Canadian approach to statutory reverse onus
provisions was also found to provide guidance to a court having no
precedents of its own. It was Dickson C.J.C. in R. v. Oakes8 and R. v.
Whyte9 and Cory J. in R. v. Downey10 who provided the beacons.
A major Canadian import into our Constitution is the approach to
limitations of rights. The scrutiny thresholds adopted by the United
States Supreme Court had little appeal. At the threshold level we have
incorporated the equivalent of section 1 of the Charter and, as is to be
expected, we have learnt much from your jurisprudence — from the
Oakes approach to more recent decisions.
A third area in respect of which we learned from the Canadian
approach relates to equality. The first equality decision of our Court was
Hugo,11 in which I followed the important dictum of L’Heureux-Dubé J.
in Egan v. Canada12 to the effect that the recognition of human dignity is
situated at the heart of the equality provision.
Finally, I would refer to the Canadian approach to extradition and
the death sentence. We were faced with this issue in Mohamed and
Another v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (Society
for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in South Africa and Another),13 a
case arising from the Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. embassies in
Kinshasa and Dar es Salaam. The South African authorities had decided
that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a Tanzanian citizen, had waived his
rights to formal extradition and handed him over to U.S. officials for
transfer to New York, where he faced the death penalty. We followed the

7

S. v. Zuma and Others, 1995 (2) SA 642, at para. 15 (South Africa CC).
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
9
[1988] S.C.J. No. 63, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
10
[1992] S.C.J. No. 48, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10 (S.C.C.).
11
President of the Republic of South Africa and another v. Hugo, 1997 (4) SA 1 (South
Africa CC).
12
[1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.).
13
2001 (3) SA 893 (South Africa CC).
8
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approach in the then recent Burns decision14 to the effect that there is no
obligation to extradite or deport any person without an assurance from
the receiving state that the person will not face a death sentence.
Needless to say, we have found valuable guidance in the jurisprudence
of other democracies including the U.S., Germany, India and Namibia,
to name but a few.
In relation to the implementation of social and economic rights the
Court has comprehensively considered the constitutionality and propriety
of issuing structural orders. In the TAC case15 it was held that such orders
are in no way inconsistent with the separation of powers and that our
courts are empowered to make such orders in appropriate cases.
However, it was also held that as the government had consistently
implemented decisions of the courts it was not appropriate to issue a
structural injunction. The Court did order the government forthwith to
distribute the antiretroviral drug, Nevirapine, for the prevention of
mother-to-child transmission of the HIV virus. The Court compelled the
government to act in a manner that was anathema to the Minister of
Health. She nonetheless complied with the order. One thinks, too, of the
decision compelling the government to provide social welfare benefits to
permanent residents as well as citizens — at a cost of many millions of
rands.16
I propose to end with a brief reference to two areas where our
Constitutional Court has struck out in new directions. The first relates to
the necessity for legislatures to hold reasonable public consultation prior
to passing controversial legislation. The Constitutional Court in effect
held that, properly construed, our Constitution creates not only a
representative democracy but also a “participative” democracy. It is not
sufficient for the people to be consulted only every five years through
the ballot box but continuously with regard to the making of legislation.
In Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly
and Others,17 the Court held that:
Under our Constitution, therefore, the obligation to facilitate public
involvement is a requirement of the law-making process.18

14
15
16
17
18

United States of America v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.).
Ministry of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (2002) 5 SA 721 (South Africa CC).
2004 (6) BCLR 569 (South Africa CC).
2006 (6) SA 416 (South Africa CC).
Id., at para. 207.
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Its decision was that a statute relating to the regulation of abortions
was a matter of intense public interest and that there had not been
reasonable public consultation in the legislative process. The statute, on
that ground, was held to be unconstitutional.
Then, earlier this year in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea
Township v. City of Johannesburg and Others,19 the City of Johannesburg
sought to evict the residents of derelict buildings in the city centre as part
of a regeneration program. The residents claimed that the provision of
suitable alternative accommodation was a precondition for an eviction
order. After hearing oral argument, the Constitutional Court ordered the
parties to “meaningfully engage” with each other to find a mutually
satisfactory solution to the problem. They were ordered further to report
back to the Court on the engagement within 30 days. This unusual order
worked and the parties did settle their differences. The City agreed to
make the existing buildings safe and habitable until appropriate
alternative accommodation was made available. The Court then issued a
general order obliging parties in such cases to “meaningfully engage”
prior to seeking relief from a court.
There are the usual problems faced by the judiciary in many
democracies — at the moment draft legislation taking away control of
the budgets of the courts from the Chief Justice and placing it in the
hands of the Minister of Justice. These problems aside, however, having
regard to where we stood at the death of Apartheid in 1994, I would
suggest that we have made remarkable progress. It has also been a matter
of personal pride that the South African Constitutional Court, in its short
life, has built a positive reputation that is recognized throughout the
democratic world. I would emphasize its contribution in the area of
social and economic rights.
South Africa has good reason to feel indebted to Canada for the
advances we have made on the often difficult road from oppression to
freedom and democracy.

19

2008 (3) SA 208 (South Africa CC).

